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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals misapplied this Court's
analysis in determining jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act so as to deprive a Utah family of the protection of Utah
Courts?
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals violated Petitioners1

constitutional rights to family integrity, to travel and to due
process of law?
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals violated the purpose of the

Juvenile Court Act and related statutes?
DECISION IN COURT OF APPEALS
The decision in the Court of Appeals is reported at 103
Utah Adv. Rep. 26.
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter was
entered on March 8, 1989. This Court has jurisdiction to review
this matter by writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2 (3)(a).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Constitution of the United States, Amendments 5, 9, and 14;
Constitution of Utah, Article 1 Sections 7 and 25; 28 U.S.C.
Section 1738A; Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3a-l(7); Sections 78-45C1 et seq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a juvenile court dependency case filed in the Juvenile
Court for Salt Lake County on August 31, 1987.

The petition was

dismissed on November 18, 1987, by order of the Honorable Franklyn
B. Matheson.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed in a decision by

the Honorable Richard C. Davidson on March 8, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a dispute between Utah parents and the San
Francisco, California Department of Social Services over the care
and placement of their newborn infant son, born in Salt Lake City
on August 24, 1987 (Tr.214-5). Because of financial difficulties,
the mother left the infant at Holy Cross Hospital for a few days
after birth (Tr. 15). The Utah Division of Family Services filed
a dependency petition in the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County,
and received an Order of Temporary Custody on August 31, 1987,
placing the child in a temporary shelter home (Tr. 37-40, 41, 356,
R.l).
The San Francisco, California Department of Social Services
filed a similar petition for temporary custody in Juvenile Court
in San Fransisco on September 4, 1987, falsely alleging that the
child was in San Francisco, and the Juvenile Court there issued a
detention order for the Utah infant (Tr.49, 50, 146-8, 153-5,
2

Ex.3). A California social worker appeared in Utah with this
detention order and removed the baby from the Utah shelter home on
September

5,

1987

(Tr.49,50,289-91). The

Utah

petition

was

subsequently dismissed on the ground that California was the more
appropriate

forum

in which

to litigate this dependency

case

pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Utah
Code Ann. §78-45C-l and related statutes (Tr.334-338, R.38-44).
The parents appealed.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, in a case of first
impression, finding that while Utah had "home stateff jurisdiction
pursuant to the UCCJA, California had "substantial connection"
jurisdiction, because the mother and the father had lived there
and the fetus had been "conceived and carried nearlv to term there"
(103 Utah Adv.Rep.27).
The Court further held that there exists no preference for
home state jurisdiction and that it was proper for the Utah court
to decline to exercise its jurisdiction solely because California
"had access to the greatest amount of relevant information" and
thus the best interests of the child were automatically served by
requiring the Utah parents to travel to California to visit the
child and contest the matter in court in San Francisco (103 Utah
Adv.Rep.28).
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Orme found that
the proper procedure would have been to stay proceedings pursuant
to Utah Code Ann.§78-45c-7(5).

The proceedings would have been

stayed until further evidence was available regarding the parents
and regarding California's basis for continued jurisdiction over
3

this Utah infant and his Utah family (103 Utah Adv.Rep.28-29). Both
the majority opinion and Judge Orme's opinion raise concerns about
the perjured California court documents and the fact that the
infant was physically removed from Utah while our court still had
jurisdiction but opined that subsequent events in the proceedings
had

rendered

these

objectionable

acts unimportant

(103 Utah

Adv.Rep.28 n.l and 29 n.2).
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is apparently a case of first impression in the United
States and clearly one of first impression in Utah.

A social

services agency in California initiated a juvenile court case in
California concerning a newborn infant in Utah after the baby was
already the subject of a juvenile court proceeding in Utah and
already in a shelter home in Utah. The social services agency in
California is the only party to this proceeding who has any
interest in maintaining this case in the courts of California. Both
parents reside in Utah and the Utah Department of Social Services
is of course located in this state.
The Utah

Juvenile

Court

saw

no

reason

jurisdiction over the parties and the case.

to

retain

its

Consequently, the

court left this Utah family with no alternative but to travel to
California to visit their baby and try to get the child back from
the California authorities.
By failing to differentiate this case from the run of the mill
UCCJA interstate custody dispute between two private contestants,
the Court of Appeals has warped the intent of the UCCJA and must
4

be reversed.
POINT I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISUNDERSTOOD AND
MISINTERPRETED THIS COURT'S BEST INTEREST
ANALYSIS IN PRIOR UCCJA CASES
The

Court

of

Appeals

correctly

argued

that

the

most

appropriate forum is determined by the best interests of the child.
The Court then cited the five factors of Utah Code Ann. §78-45c7(3) which are used to determine jurisdictional best interests.
(a) If another state is or recently was the
childfs home state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection
with the child and his family or with the child
and one or more of the contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is more
readily available in another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another
forum which is no less appropriate; and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court
of this state would contravene any of the
purposes stated in section 78-45c-l.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did a cursory and sloppy
analysis of the five factors as they relate to jurisdiction of
California and Utah over W.D., the infant.

The Court concluded

that Utah "may be11 the home state of the child, but that the Court
"need not decide that issue."

Such a failure to determine the

child1s home state is unhelpful in serving the best interests of
the child.
In

any

event, California

did

not

meet

the home

state

requirement at the time of the commencement of the proceeding.
5

Furthermore, Californiafs connections with the infant after its
birth were the result of misstatement and misconduct and therefore
such connections should not be judicially cognizable:
[W]e cannot condone the manner in which W.D.
was taken to California before Judge Matheson
declined jurisdiction nor the misstatement of
information contained in the California
petition.
(103 Utah Adv.Rep.28, n.3)

See Tr. 49, 50, 146-8, 153-5, 289-

91.
Despite such a showing of bad faith and misrepresentation on
the part of the California petitioner, the Utah Court of Appeals
inappropriately
California

approved

thereby

Utahfs

failing

to

deferring
apply

both

of

jurisdiction

the

Utah

and

to
the

California unclean hands provision:
If the petitioner for an initial decree has
wrongfully taken the child from another state
or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct
the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
for purposes of adjudication of custody if this
is just and proper under the circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-8(l).
The Court failed to correctly apply the first prong of the
substantial connection test which is "the child and his parents,
or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant
connection with this state," Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(b)(i)
(emphasis added).

While the parents may have had significant

connections to California prior to their move, the child had no
significant connections to California.

Further, the child had

never been in California until California authorities removed the
child from his parents and took him to California.
6

The Court inappropriately suggested that the location of the
fetus during

conception

and pregnancy provides

connection to California.

(103 Utah Adv.Rep 27)

a substantial
The language of

the UCCJA suggests that the location of the fetus during conception
and pregnancy is not significant for determination of home state.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-2(5).

This statutory language plus common

sense suggests a logical conclusion that the location of the fetus
during conception and pregnancy is not a significant connection for
the child once that child is born. Without the childfs significant
connection to the state of California, the question of the parents1
significant connection cannot be reached.
Because the Court failed to apply the first step of the
substantial connection analysis, it improperly reached the second
step of the analysis regarding substantial evidence.
Once the Court improperly reached the second prong of the
substantial connection test, it then incorrectly applied that test.
The second prong requires
concerning

the

childfs

there to be

present

or

"substantial

future

care,

evidence

protection,

training, and personal relationships;" Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)
(1987); Cal. Civil Code §5152 (West 1983) (emphasis added).

The

Court overlooked the requirement that suih evidence must pertain
to present or future care.

Instead, the Court looked to old

information the California authorities had regarding Mthe parents1
mode

of

living,

psychological

makeup,

marital

relationship,

parenting skills, and past interrelationship with W. D.'s older
sister.M

(103 Utah Adv.Rep. 27) (emphasis added).

The Court did

not show how such evidence was relevant to the child's present or

7

future care.

In fact, this evidence was gathered to describe the

child's sister's past care, protection, training, and personal
relationships. Information regarding the child's sister's welfare
is beyond the Court's purview.
The Court also failed to correctly apply the significant
connection and substantial evidence test as it related to Utah's
jurisdiction over the child.
The child was born in Utah. Utah was the only state the child
lived in until the California authorities took the child.

The

mother lived in Utah and intended to continue to live in Utah with
her child. Additionally, the child's father moved to Utah shortly
after the child's birth.

He also intended to find work and

continue to live in Utah with the child.

Therefore, the child as

well as both his parents have significant connections to the state
of Utah, thus satisfying the first prong of the substantial
connection test.
The Court also failed to correctly apply the second prong of
the test to Utah. Because both the mother and the father intended
to continue to live in Utah with the child and because they
intended to keep the child and care for him in Utah, all evidence
concerning

the

child's

present

and

future

care, protection,

training, and personal relationships was in Utah.
In

addition,

the

Court

of

Appeals

misconstrued

the

definitional section of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA).

Without analysis the court concluded that "The PKPA

does not apply to child neglect and dependency proceedings"(103
Utah Adv.Rep.28 n.l).
8

In a footnote and without any analysis, the court made an
important policy decision which has the effect of nullifying the
application of a federal law to Utah.
A more thorough analysis of the PKPA and its language would
likely lead to the opposite conclusion, as the Arizona Court of
Appeals held

in Matter

of Pima County Juvenile Action. 147

Ariz.527, 711 P.2d 1200,1206 (1985). This Court needs to consider
the applicability of PKPA to cases like this one and provide
guidance to lower courts on this subject. Likewise if this Court
were to interpret PKPA as applying here, the mode of analysis
concerning the exercise of jurisdiction between one state with home
state

jurisdiction

and

another

with

significant

connection

jurisdiction would always be resolved in favor of the home state,
a result directly contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals
in the present case.

POINT II
APPLICATION OF THE UCCJA TO REMOVE A UTAH
CHILD FROM THE STATE AND HIS UTAH FAMILY VIOLATES
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE UTAH
AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS TO
FAMILY INTEGRITY AND TO TRAVEL.
The Court of Appeals in its decision repeatedly castigates the
baby's mother for moving to Utah, decrying this as "shop[ping] for
jurisdictionff, 103 Utah Adv.Rep.28. This analysis, based at best
on a very selective reading of the record, also establishes a
dangerous precedent. Are new residents of the state of Utah somehow
second class citizens who are not entitled to full protection of
9

the courts of this state? Again this analysis is half-baked and has
the potential of setting in motion a series of unwanted results in
later cases which this Court should stop here.
This

is particularly

true

where

this

partial

analysis

contravenes a right protected by the Utah and U.S. Constitutions-the right to travel. This right has been recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Guest, 314 U.S.160 (1966) among
other cases and, based on our state constitution, in City of Salina
v. Wisden. 737 P.2d 981,983 (Utah 1987).
Making this decision even more egregious is the conclusion
that some Utah citizens are not entitled to the protection of our
courts, contrary to the policy enumerated in state statute and case
law that

,f

the jurisdiction of our courts should be extended to

protect the citizens of this State consistent with concepts of
fairness and equal justice under due process of law.11 Union Ski
Company v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257,1259 (Utah 1976).
It seems ironic that a citizen of Utah damaged by a defamatory
telephone

conversation

initiated

outside

Utah

can

assert

jurisdiction in Utah, Berrett v. Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest,
623 F. Supp. 946 (D.Utah 1985), but that Utah parents deprived of
the custody of their child cannot litigate the matter in a Utah
court.
The situation created by the Court of Appeals1 decision is
more than ironic—it offends the sanctity of the family long since
recognized by this court. In In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364, 1372,1377
(Utah 1982), this Court found that a parent has a fundamental
right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain his relationship

10

with his child•

The Court also found an "inherent and retained

right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child
under Article I,§7 and §25 cmd that the United States Constitution
recognizes

and protects

the same right under

the Ninth

and

Fourteenth Amendments."
The J.P. case is about termination of a parentfs rights. That
is not the case here. But sanctioning the removal of a twelve-day
old infant from the state and then telling the parents that
visitation and further litigation will take place in California is
just as drastic as termination. Certainly there is no way for a low
income family to bond with a baby in a shelter home in another
state; there is no way to feed the child or engage in the labor and
joy of assisting in the childfs development and training. At the
least, retaining

jurisdiction

in Utah would be necessary to

effectuate state policy as articulated in the J.P. case and in the
Juvenile Court Act, Utah Code Ann.§78-3a-l(7), to "attempt to
preserve and strengthen family ties where possible."
The Court of Appeals1

ruling sanctions a state-sponsored

severing of family ties and gives the state carte blanche to
disrupt family life.

This important policy revision, again made

without full analysis and in disregard of this Court's earlier
cases should be reviewed and corrected by this Court.

11

POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PROTECT PETITIONERS9 DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS BY ALLOWING THE CALIFORNIA COURT TO TAKE
JURISDICTION IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA LAW AND DUE
PROCESS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case essentially
states that the Utah courts must decline jurisdiction in UCCJA
cases regardless of the manner in which the other state handles the
case and whether or not the other state's actions are taken in
accordance with the UCCJA, due process and principles of fairness.
Again because this is a case of first impression, the Court of
Appeals needs guidance from this Court. If this were a modification
case, an initial inquiry would be whether the court of the other
state

"assumed

jurisdiction

under

statutory

provisions

substantially in accordance with this act...,w Utah Code Ann.§7845c-13. The same type of analysis is needed here before the Utah
court chooses to decline jurisdiction.
Even a superficial analysis would disclose that the California
proceedings were defective. A partial list of horrors is as
follows;

the petition failed to comply with California law

regarding information about the child's whereabouts; the telephone
notice to the mother in Salt Lake City at 4:00 p.m. of a detention
hearing in San Francisco the next morning was woefully inadequate;
and the California court failed to communicate with the Utah court
even after being apprised of the UCCJA requirement to do so. Yet,
under the Court of Appeals analysis, none of these problems need
be remedied and Utah must forego the resolution of this case and
the protection of its citizens to somehow comply with a very odd

12

view of the UCCJA.
This Court should review this case to determine the proper
remedy for failure to comply with the UCCJA, the PKPA or due
process by a state competing with Utah for UCCJA jurisdiction.
Finally, this
California

social

is a contest between Utah
services

agency.

None

parents

of

the

and a
policy

considerations that form the backdrop of the UCCJA and the PKPA
apply here, or if they do, they should be applied against San
Francisco

Social

Services.

In a

"normal"

custody

case, two

contestants with an interest in obtaining Custody of the child are
situated in different states. The rules of the UCCJA and PKPA are
designed to facilitate the determination of custody. But here, the
only basis for the Juvenile Court of California taking custody is
if there is an emergency that requires action concerning a child
in California. There is no such child. When California began its
case and even when the social worker picked up the baby in Utah,
he was in a shelter home under the care of the Utah Social Services
Department.
California's emergency jurisdiction should have only continued
until

the

proper

home

state

could

be

determined

and

then

arrangements should have been made to have all further custody
determinations rendered in the home state. There can be no question
that the home state is and was Utah.

But to allow California to

continue to make custody placements and orders long after any
emergency has expired again flaunts the purpose of the UCCJA and
again incorrectly decides a question of first impression in this
state.
13

Many other courts, in considering the emergency provisions of
the UCCJA, similar to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c~3(l)(c), have found
that the state in which the emergency occurs has jurisdiction only
long enough to deal with the emergency. See E.P. v. District Court
of Garfield County. 696 P.2d 254, 262, 263 (Colo. 1985). California
should have never taken jurisdiction in this case in the first
place or, at the least, should have returned the matter and the
child to Utah as soon as the child was in shelter and there was no
longer any emergency. Utah should not have removed itself from
resolving the question of custody but should have kept jurisdiction
of the matter all along. Such a procedure was incorrect and should
be reversed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
This Court should take this opportunity

to correct the

numerous analytical errors in the Court of Appeal's decision and
provide

guidance

to

lower

courts

regarding

the

correct

interpretation of the UCCJA to protect the rights of Utah citizens
to use the Courts of this state to protect their rights.

The

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
DATED this _ 7 ^ d a y of

/4h)V) /
^

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Petitioners

BY!MARTHA PIERCE

14

, 1989.

r

I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI to: Paul Van Dam,
Attorney General, and Sandra Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General,
236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on this
,

, 1989, postage prepaid.
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STATE 0? UTAH, In the i n t e r e s t
D3AXZ, William

of
Case Ho. 734134

DC3 ( 0 3 / 2 4 / 3 7 )

A p e r s o n under e i g h t e e n v e a r s o f age
WE222AS a Motion to Set Aside, Motion for New Hearing, Motion for
Shelter Hearing and Motion for Restoration of Custody, filed for and on
behalf of Christine Drake and William Mark Drake, natural parents of William
Drake, came on for hearing before the above entitled Court on September 29,
1937; and,
WEZ2ZAS, Bruce Plenk, Esq,, and Jeffrey Burkhardt, Esq,, appeared and
argued said Motions on behalf of the Petitioners, and Frederick Oddone,
Chief Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, appeared and argued in opposition to
said Motions on behalf of the State of Utah, Division of Family Services,
and,
WHZ2ZAS, the Court being fully advised in the premises, it hereby orders
as follows:
ORDER
1.

Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 73-3a-45,
the Motion to Set Aside the previous Order of Dismissal signed by
this Court on September 14, 1937, is granted on the grounds that
the issuing of said Order without notice to the parents and hearing
may have significant effect en the alledged custodial rights of
said parents,

2.

Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 73-3a-46,
the Motion for New Hearing in relation to said previous Order of
Dismissal is granted to said parents on the grounds that new
evidence as to the residence and domicile of the mother may be
available which might effect said Order.

3.

The Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the previous Motion to
Dismiss was not signed by a duly licensed attorney is denied on the
grounds that the appropriate state attorney stood ready and willing
to correct said omission on notification thereof.

4.

The Motion for New Shelter Hearing is denied on the grounds that •
there appears no irregularity to the Court in the original shelter
hearing and that the granting of such request for rehearing is
discretionary vith the Court, (See Rules 3 & 13, UJCRPP).

5.

Tee Motions for Restoration of Custody and for an Order returning
the child to the State of Utah are taken under advisement pending
the new hearing herewith granted regarding the previous order of
dismissal, it being anticipated by the Court that the respective
parties will present evidence and/or argument at such hearing
relevant to such issues to assist the Court in ruling thereon.

APPENDIX 1-1

<2)

6.

The Court takes under advisenent any ruling regarding application
of the Unifora Child Custody Jurisdiction Act as argued by the
petitioner pending further hearing.
«g».

Dated this

21st day of October . 1937.
BY THE COURT

JUDGE F2AHXZYN B. KATEESOIT
cc:

Bruce Plenk, Esq.
J e f f r e y Burkhardt, Esq.
County Attorney
D i v i s i o n of Family S e r v i c e s

ts/0524A
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lugus: 2^, 19;Si, Christine wan. delivered at a child j William Drake,
at che K0I7 Cross Hospital in S
3. August 25, 13irf , That Utah Division of Family Services waj
contacted by authorities cf Holy Cross Hospital. The authorities
expressed concern as to releasing the child from the Hospital with the
mother, as the mother appeared unable to see to the proper care of the
child. Trie mother vas released from the hospital
The child was held.
The evidence is contradictory as to whether the mother left the child in
the hospital voluntarily pending securing of a piaca to live, or whether
she was refused permission to take the chi^d from the hospital by a
hospital worker.
-;. August 31, 193*. Petition He. 7431 ^ alleging the child to be
d^Dez>d<*z,z was filed with the Utah Juvenile Court by the Utah Division of
Family Services. An Crier was issued giving temporary custody of the
child to the Utah Agency. The child was released by the Hospital to Che
Agency and placed by the Agency in shelter care. The Petition v.ir sec
for hearing on November 2 „
i". September 1, 193"', \ shelter care hearing was held in the Utah
Juvenile Court, A Commissioner found probable cause for the need of
continued shelter care, and affirmed custody in the Agency for shelter
care. The Commissioner set the matter for further review on September 9
and gave authority to the Agency to release the child frnm shelter prior
*. .j c %, „ (J » * A p^ j r <, <f i s r - e t i c n ,
6, S e p t e m b e r 2 , 1 9 3 7 . P e t i t i o n H o , b'J-;431 w a s file.i i n L^e J u v e n i l e
Court cf San Francisco County, California, alleging the child to be
dependent and in need of supervision, together with a Request for Order
of Detention.
on was issued by the San
Jeptember A, 1337, /' • Drier of Dete
Francio:.i Juvenile Court. af:e: hearin g in that Court.
V , -eptembe: 5, IJ37. I..e c;:iid was released by the Utah Agency worker
from shelter to the physical custody of a San Francisco welfare worker
for transportation of th? child f i 1 f[r «b to S?r Fr^cisco for placement.
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9- September 14, 1937. A Motion for Dismissal of Utah Petition 74313vas filed in the Utah Juvenile Court by the Salt Lake County Attorney
and an Order of Dismissal vas signed by a Juvenile Court Judge e:t-parte
10. September 13, 1937. The natural parents of the child moved the Uta
Juvenile court to set aside its previous Order of Dismissal and to gran
a nev hearing in relation thereto, and asked for an Order restoring
physical custody of the child to the parents and directing the return o
the child to the State of Utah.
11. September 29, 1937. Oral argument vas heard by the Utah Juvenile
Court on the parent's Motion to set aside the previous Order of
Dismissal.
12. October 21, 1937. A Minute Entry and Order of the Utah Court
setting aside its previous Order of Dismissal and granting a nev hearing
vas entered.
13. November 5, 1937. A legal Memorandum vas received from the parents
in support of their Motion for restoration of custody.
14. November 17, 1937. A legal Memorandum vas received from the State
of Utah in support of dismissal and deference to California jurisdiction.
15. November 13, 1937. After a hearing the Utah Juvenile Court found
that California vas the more appopriate forum to determine and supervise
custody of child, and issued <L Minute Order that the Utah Petition of
August 31 be dismissed.
B.

Issue

The basic operational i s s u e before the Court i s whether r e l e a s e of the
c h i l d by the Utah a u t h o r i t i e s to the State of C a l i f o r n i a a u t h o r i t i e s vas
appropriate and, i f not, whether the Utah Court should now attempt to secure
the return of the child to Utah. The l e g a l i s s u e i s whether or not there i s
any provision of lav which mandates r e s t o r a t i o n of Utah j u r i s d i c t i o n
regarding said child and a s s e r t i o n thereof by the Utah Court.
Decision
1. It is the position of this Court that irrespective of the legal
residence of the mother at the time of the birth of the child in Utah
and without specifically finding in relation to that issue, that the
Utah Juvenile Court had jin personam jurisdiction to intervene in the
protection of the child (Utah Code Section 73-3a-24), and justification
to do so especially in light of the apparent indigent circumstances of
the mother and concerns expressed by the hospital attendants as to her
ability to care for the child following birth. (See Section
78-45c-3(c)).
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2. It vas therefore appropriate for the Stat2 of Utah to intervene and
take temporary physical custody of the child. Tie procedures fallowed
v*re according to the previsions of the Utah Juvenile Court Act,
Attempt vas cade to notify the 30tier as u cte hearing held to canfira
placement of the child in shelter but her whereabouts could not be
ascertaine-1
-sequencly, upon ier being located and before tie c±t: Id
vas removed frra the State of Utah, she was given the opportunity to
request a second shelter hearing which snze failed to do. Although tie
Shelter Crier did in fact affirm and perpetuate tie separation of tie
Bother from her chili, iu e process requirements were observed and tie
Court finds no impropriety or inappropriate active in tie procedures
followed by tie State Ager^v In assumirs; r-'p physical custod7» care and
protection of tie ciild
3, lie Juvenile CJU. - maj d-sai.** J, y- . ion ,and terminate tie
proceedings relating to a child at any time if such action is in the
interest of justice and the welfare of the child, Section 73-3a-23;
Rule 22, UJCH??. Since it is the finding of the Court, as hereinafter
set out, t.tat the State of California is the most appropriate and
convenient forum to determine custody of the child, termination of tie
Htih proceeding:! hi rh * Utah Juve:i:l> f:ur* is appropriate.
4,

Release of the ciild by the Utah agency to t.s California autorities
. not a "placement" of tie ciild by the Utah agency. The Utai agency
-j.^ not attempting to arrange for the care of tie ciild in another
jurisdiction or acting in the capacity cf a sending agency v::h
intention of retaining jurisdiction over the child to determine matters
relating to the custocy, care or control of the child. It vas
understood that tne California authorities were assuming full
responsibility of the child including cost of car-! with adyance
k**J« ledge and under California Court Order. There vas, therefore, no
"placement" outside of the State of Utah by the Utah Agency without Utai
Court approval in violation of Section 73-3a-42(3) and no violation of
the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (Section 55-3b~l
et.seq). T;i3 Utah Agency in transferring the child to the California
Agency, was acting under legal advice and t'le assumption, however
incorrect the assumption might have been, that the State of California
had custody jurisdiction cf the child at that time and that the State of
Utai vas simply releasing any further custodial relationship witi tie
child to a State having appropriate jurisdiction. There vas no willing
or knowing attempt or intent to circumvent the lav, nor vas there any
apparent conspiracy to take any action other than that in the best
interest nc the chili.
1

5. Counsel agree and t%e Courr cuncurs that the provisions of tha
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, adopted in both Utah and
California, do apply in this case. Tie Court, having concluded that
there vas no violation of any other applicable statute or inappropriate
procsd ire followed by the Utah authorities, feels further that
application of a- ! r i'. 1 1' *>J r*i sa 1 ^ Art sioul I I D V determine resolu t.1 >n
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the differences between the parties as to whether or ncc this Court
ould assert Utah jurisdiciccn and Order return of the child to Utah.
6. Tzz Court analyzes the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in ti
concent of the instant case as follows:
a. It is the general purpose of the Act to assure that litigation
concerning the custody of a child takes place in the State with
which the child and his fanily have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning the care, protection,
training and personal relationships is readily available. In ligh
of the mother's previous prolonged residence in the State of
California in coaparision with her very short presence in Utah,
that the father of the child lives and works in California, that
extended fanily members reside in that State, that custody
proceedings are pending in that State regarding a sibling of the
child, and that welfare and state agencies are most familiar with
the fanily in that State, the child and fanily have a closer
connection with the State of California and that this state should
decline to enercise its jurisdiction. See 73-45c-l(c).
b. Although this State nay be considered the "hone state" of the
child at the tine of his birth, (Section 73-4Sc-2(5)), and that
this State had jurisdiction to make a custody determination
(Section 73-45c-3(l)(c)), California could likewise clain such
jurisdiciton (Section 73-43c-3(l)(b)). The best interst of the
child should be the determining factor. (Section 73-45c-3(l)(d)).
b. The State of California nay have been precipitous in making a
custody determination on September 4 in light of the Shelter Order
of this Court of September 1 and the Petition for custody filed in
this State on August 31 [Section 73-45c-5(l)] . Nonetheless, this
Court may decline (dismiss) jurisdiction at any time before making
a decree if it finds it is an inconvenient forum and that another
state is a more convenient forum. Section 73-45c-7(i).
d. It is the finding of this Court that California has a closer
connection with the child and his family (73-43c-7(3)(b)) for the
reasons enumerated under paragraph 6a and above, and that therefore
that State is the more appropriate forum. 73-45c-7(l).
e. Having so found this Court may dismiss the proceedings filed in
this State. 73-45c-7(5).
7. It is my conclusion that this Court may decline jurisdiction in this
matter, dismiss the Utah proceedings, and that this Court is neither
under compulsion to assert jurisdiction over the child nor to demand his
return to the State of Utah.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah in the interest of: W. D.,
v.
Christine DRAKE,
Appellant.
No. 870S73-CA
FILED: March 3, 1989
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake
County
Honorable Franklyn B. Matheson
ATTORNEYS:
Bruce Pienk, Salt Lake City, Jeffrey
Burkhardt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent
Before Judges Davidson, Garff, and Orme.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
On November 18, 1987, the juvenile court,
dismissed a pending state petition ruling that
California was the more appropriate and
convenient forum to determine custody of W.
D. The natural parents of W. D. appeal the
dismissal. We affirm.
FACTS
Prior to W. D.'s birth, Christine Drake and
William Mick, W. D.'s natural parents, lived
together in San Francisco, California. Drake
had previously given birth to another child, I.
D., in 1984 but California authorities had
taken her into protective custody. Drake and
Mick sought the return of the child so the
California authorities, over a period of several
years, conducted evaluations of the parents,
administered placement programs, and were
involved in court hearings with the parents.
Following a hearing held on July 31, 1987,
at which the California court recommended
termination of parental rights in I. D., Drake
left San Francisco and traveled to Salt Lake
City. She was eight months pregnant with W.
D. and came to Utah because she and Mick
had decided that Utah law would allow them
to retain custody of this child after its birth.
Mick stayed behind in San Francisco. Drake
arrived in Salt Lake City on August 1, 1987,
bringing with her little money and few belongings. For most of that month, she lived at
various places within the city, including the
women's shelter.
On August 24, 1987 Drake delivered W. D.
at Holy Cross Hospital. Two days later, Drake
left the hospital, leaving W. D. behind. On
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August 31, after Drake had failed to visit W.
D., a petition was filed with the juvenile court
by the state. The petition alleged that W. D.
was a dependent child and that California had
jurisdiction over W. D., and was willing to
adjudicate the 'infant's legal status if the
infant is returned to California." An order of
temporary custody, placing custody of W. D.
with the Utah Division of Family Services
("Family Services"), was issued by the court.
A shelter hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3a-30 (Supp. 1988) was held the next
day. However, the case worker was unable to
find Drake to notify her of the hearing. As a
result, custody was left with Family Services.
The next day, September 2, Drake appeared,
met with the case worker, and was informed
about the shelter hearing. Drake refused to
give her address and did not request another
hearing.
On these same facts, a petition was filed in
California on September 3, which also alleged
that W. D. was a dependant child. A hearing
was held in San Francisco on September 4.
Notice was given to both Drake and Mick,
and Mick was present with counsel. Following
the hearing, a detention order for W, D. was
issued. On September 5, California officials
flew to Salt Lake City, picked up W. D. from
Family Services personnel, and returned with
him to California.
On September 12, Judge Matheson signed
an ex parte order dismissing the case in Utah.
Subsequently, Drake and Mick moved to set
aside the dismissal. This motion was granted
and a new hearing date set to consider the
state's motion to dismiss. A hearing was held
on the 5th and 18th of November 1987.
During the hearing, each of the parents were
represented by counsel and each side presented
evidence and argument. At the conclusion, the
court found that California was the more
appropriate and convenient forum to determine custody, and granted the state's motion
to dismiss the petition.
The question before us is whether the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA"), Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-l to26 (1987), required the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction rather than defer to California as
the more appropriate and convenient forum.
DISCUSSION
The parents first argue that California did
not have any basis for jurisdiction over W. D.
since Drake left before the child was born.
Like Utah, California has adopted the
UCCJA. Cal. Civil Code §5152 (West 1983).
The pertinent provisions of these statutes are
identical. They provide that a state court has
jurisdiction to make or modify a child custody
order if any of the following conditions are
met:
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(a) This state
is che home state
of the jhild JE the time or commcncemenr of the proceeding . .
(b) It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state
assume jurisdiction because ... the •
child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this
state, and ... there is available in
this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) The child is physically present in
this state and ... the child has been
abandoned or ... it is necessary in
an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or
abuse or is otherwise neglected or
dependent
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(Jl (IMS I* i nl
Civil Code §5152 (West 1983).
The statutes define "home state" as "the
state in which the child immediately preceding
the time involved lived with his parents, a
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at
least six consecutive months, and in the case
of a child less than six months old the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of
the persons mentioned.* Utah Code Ann. §7845c-2(5)(t987); Cal. Civil Code §5151(5).
Under this definition California fails to
qualify as W. D.'s "home state." Utah may
qualify as W, D.'s "home state" since he was
born here, but problems arise in whether the
child "lived from birth * with Drake and
whether the state is a "person acting as
parent." However, we need not decide that
issue. Unlike the PKPA1 the Utah UCCM
does not give a preference to the "hunit
state." The significant connection or substantial connection basis "comes into play either
when the home state test cannot be met or as
an alternative to that test. * 9 UCCJA
(U.L.A.) §3 comment, 144 (1988) (emphasis
added). Even though a certain state may be
the "home state," if 'the child and his family
have equal or stronger ties with another state"
that other state also has jurisdiction. Id.; see
also Smith v, Superior Court of San Mateo
County, 68 Cal. App. 3d 457f 137 Cal. Rptr.
348, 352 (1977). Therefore, the fact that Utah
may technically have "home state* jurisdiction
will not prevent California from also having
jurisdiction under the "substantial connection"
biMS

In the instant case, Drake and Mick had
lived in California for several years. W. D.
was conceived and carried nearly to term
there. At the time the petition in California
wis filed, Mick was still living in San Francisco2 and Drake had only left to find another
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state with more favorable custody laws. Under
these circumstances Drake, Mick and W. D.
all had substantial connections with California, thereby meeting the first requirement of
the substantial connection test. Additionally,
California authorities had information on the
parents' mode of living, psychological
makeup, marital relationship, parenting skills,
and past interrelationship with W. D.'s older
sister. This was Enough to meet the required
need of substantial evidence on W. D.'s care,
protection, training, and relationships to
satisfy the scconji requirement. Although W.
D had never been in California his physical
presence "while desirable, [was] not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his
custody." Cal. Civil Code §5152(3); sec also
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(3) (1987).
California had jurisdiction to issue the detention order even before W. D. was transported
to that state.3
Alternatively, the paients ar^ue that amce a
petition had been filed in Utah and a temporary custody order issued four days prior, the
California court 'was not "exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act*
when it issued its detention order.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-6(l) (1987)
limits the exercise of a courts jurisdiction
under some circumstances*
A court of Ithis state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if
Ji the time of filing the petition a
proceeding concerning the custody
of the child was pending in a court
of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity
with this act, unless the proceeding
is stayed by| the court of the other
state because this state is a more
appropriate forum or for other
reasons
California is bound by a similar pro*, man
Cal Civil Code §5155(1) (West 1983),
We reject the parents' interpretation of this
section. The unilateral filing of a petition in
one state does not prohibit the filing of a
petition in another state which also has juris- .
diction. Peterson v Peterson, 464 A.2d 202,
205 (Me. 1983) But more importantly, the
purpose of section 78-45c-6(l) "is to encourage judicial restraint in exercising jurisdiction whenever aiiother state appears to be in a
better position to determine custody of a
child." 9 UCCJA (U.L.A.) §7, comment, 234
(1988). UItimate|y, it is""less important which
court exercises jurisdiction but that courts of
several states involved act in partnership to
bring about the best possible solution for a
child's future." 9 UCCJA (U.L.A.) prefatory
note, 118 (1988) (emphasis added). Sec also
Brokus v. Brokus, 420 N.E.2d 1242, 1247
(Ind. App. 1981); Rex ford v, Rexford, 631
P.2d 475, 479 (Alaska 1980).
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Given this purpose, we will not quibble over
the point at which one court or the other
acquired priority-in-time jurisdiction. Had
the courts both attempted to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the matter, priority-intime would have been important. In re Guardianship of Donaldson, 178 Cah App. 3d 477,
223 Cai. Rptr. 707, 714 (Cah Ct. App. 1986).
However, a court which has priority-in-time
jurisdiction can 'yield jurisdiction" if another
court is the more appropriate forum. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children
Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L.
Rev. 1207,1231(1969).
Finally, the parents argue that the court
abused its discretion in determining that California was the more appropriate forum in
which to litigate the custody of W. D.
Just which forum is the most appropriate is
determined by the best interests of the child.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-7(3) (1987); Utah
Code Ann. §78-45c-3(i)(b) (1987); Tuttle
v. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Utah
1981). See also Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382,
383 (Utah 1987); Kelly v/ Drancy, 754 P.2d
92, 95 (Utah App. 1988). Several factors may
be taken inro account by the judge in determining best interests:
(a) if another state is or recentl)
was the child's home state;
(b) if another state has a closei
connection with the child and his
family or with the child and one or
more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily
available in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on
another forum which is no less
appropriate; and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by
a court of this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in
§78-45c-l.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-7(3).
Furthermore, "(although the child is the
center o( attention in a custody proceeding, J
the main inquiry is directed toward .... adults
and toward making a prediction for the future
concerning the superior ability of one of them
to surround the child with the necessary security, affection, and all other needs of a
growing child." Bodenheimer, 22 Vand. L.
Rev. at 1223. In the instant case, substantial
information concerning the parents' abilities
and past history was in California. The
mother had only recently come to Utah, but
had lived for years in California. Finally, the
exposed purpose in coming to Utah was to
shop for jurisdiction.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say

the judge abused his discretion in deciding that
California had access to the greatest amount
of relevant information, and so, in the best
interests of the child, was the most appropriate and convenient forum to litigate the
custodv of W. D.
We affirm.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
I CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 28 U.S.C.A.
§1738A (West Supp. 1988). The PKPA does not
apply to child neglect and dependency proceedings.
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Avinger, 104
N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290, 292 (1986), and so is not
important to the resolution of this case.
2. The facts and circumstance considered are those,
in existence when the petition was filed. Rexford v.
Rexford, 631 P.2d 475,478 (Alaska 1980).
3. Although we cannot condone the manner in
which W. O. was taken to California before Judge
Matheson declined jurisdiction, nor the misstate:
ment of information contained in the California
petition, we believe the subsequent hearings provided the parents adequate due process to protect
their rights. See in re Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616
P.2d 608. 610 (Utah 1980).
ORME, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
I concur in the substantive analysis set forth
in the main opinion and agree with the conclusion that the Utah court did not abuse its
"discretion in deciding that California had
access to the greatest amount of relevant information, and so, in the best interests of the
child, was the most appropriate and convenient forum to litigate the custody of W. D." I
disagree only with the conclusion that dismissal of the Utah action was the appropriate
means for implementing that decision.
I believe the Utah court erred in dismissing
the petition filed with it rather than simply
staying the proceeding as authorized in Utah
Code Ann. §73-45c-7(5) (1987).» Events
were simply too unsettled to warrant outright
dismissal. The Utah proceeding should have
been kept alive pending further clarification of
the .situation: Would Drake remain in Utah
and establish a legitimate residence here, or
would she return to California? Would Mick
stay on in California or join Drake in Utah?
If Mick came to Utah, would California in
fact retain jurisdiction.over W.-D. since W. D.
was born in Utah and was still in Utah when
the California petition was filed?2
Indeed, as it happened, Mick joined Drake
in Utah, the two are enrolled in parenting
classes, W. D. has been placed in a shelter
home here, and Utah social workers are assisting with the transition to unification of the
family-but all under the supervision of a
California court. Had the action here been
kept alive, the Utah court would have been in
a position to monitor the situation and could
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have reactivated the Utah proceeding after it
became apparent that Utah actually would
have the greatest interest in W, D. arid his
family.
Conceding that, all things considered, California may have initially seemed the sensible
forum to exercise jurisdiction, nonetheless, the
Utah court should have merely stayed the
proceeding before it rather than dismissing it
outright. I would vacate the order of dismissal, remand with instructions to enter an
order merely staying the Utah proceeding, and
thereby permit Utah, on appropriate motion,
to reassert jurisdiction over this Utah family.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Section 73-4,5c-7(5) provides

with in:; • anph

asis:

If the court Finds that it is an inconve
nient forum and that a court of another
state is a more appropriate forum, it
may dismiss the proceedings, or it may
stay the proceedings upon condition that
a custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another named state or upon
any other conditions wfyjcJi may be
just and proper, including the condition
that a moving party stipulate his consent
and submission to the jurisdiction of the
other forum.
2. The California petition falsely recited,
under penalty of perjury, that W. D.
was in emergency custody in California
when the petition was filed there oh
September 4, 1987. However, Mick'act*
ended the hearing on the petition held
that same day, with counsel. The actual
facts fortunately emerged at the hearing
and the California court made its decision, fully informed of the fact that W%
D. was actually in Utah at the time.
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AMENDMENT EX
(Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration m the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the pnvileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive amy person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
S e c . 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
1896

S e c . 25. [Rights retained b y people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the people. iao*
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(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms
and snail not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child
custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a
court of another State.
(b) As used in this section, the ter m—
f I) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
"contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to
: 7 o r visitation of a child;
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a
mur* providing for the custody or visitation of a child,,, and includes permanent
•• mporary orders, and initial orders and modifications;
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time
involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent;
for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six
months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such
persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as
part of the six-month or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination" whi :h
modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a pi i ::n
custody determination concerning the same child, whether made by the sam i
court or not;
(6) "person acting .as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has
physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court
or claims a right to custody;
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child; and
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States.
(c) A child custody ce^
,-provisions of this section only ,f~(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State
within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention
by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to' live in
such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best! interest of the child that a court of
such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the
child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such
State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is
available in such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in
the best interest of the child that sucth court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this
-•^tion.

jurisdiction of a court, of a State which has made a child custody
jn consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as
tne requirement of subsection (c) (1) of this section continues to be met and such
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable notice and opportuni]
ty to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose
ights
h.v-e not been previously terminated and any person who has physic
' of a
1

(0 A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody o:
child
-;i-'e by a court of another State, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a
custody determination commenced during the pendbney of a proceeding in a court of
another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination
(Added Pub.L. 96-611, § 3(a), Dec. 23, 19S0, 94 Stat. 3569.)
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7S-3a-l. Juvenile court — Purposes — Jurisdiction.
The juvenile court is estabhsned as a forum for the
resolution ot all matters proDeriv brougnt before itT
consistent with appucaole constitutional and statutory requirements of due process The court has the
jurisdiction, powers, and duties under this chapter to.
(1) promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate
sanctions on persons who have committed acts in
violation of law,
(2) wnere approonate, order rehabilitation,
reeducation, and treatment for persons who have
committed act3 bringing them within the court's
jurisdiction.
(3) adjudicate matters that relate to abused,
neglected* and dependent children and to provide
care and protection for these children by placement, protection, and custody orders;
(4/ adjudicate matters that relate to children
who are beyond parental or adult control and to
estaolish appropriate authority over these children by means of placement and control orders;
(5) order appropriate measures to promote
guidance and control, preferably in the child's
own home, as an aid m the prevention of future
unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship
(6) remove a child from parental custody only
where the minor's safety or welfare, or the public
3afety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded, and
(7) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to
act in the best interests of the children in all
cases and attempt to preserve and strengthen
family ties wnere possible
i^sa
7S-45o-l. Purposes — Construction,
(1) The general purposes of this act are to
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict
with courts of other states in matters of child
custodv which have in the past resulted m the
shifting of children from state to state with
harmful effects on their well-being,
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of
other states to the end that a custody decree is
rendered in that state which can best decide the
case m the interest of the child,
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custodv of a child take place ordinarily in the state
with which the child and his family have the
closest connection and where significant evidence
concerning hi3 care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is most readily available,
and that c&MYta ol xh\s stata decime the exercise
of jurisdiction wnen the child and his family have
a closer connection with another state,
(d) discourage continuing controversies over
child custodv in the interest of greater stability
of aome env ironment and of secure family relationships for the child,
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removal* of children undertaken to obtain custody
awards,
(f) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of
other states in this state insofar as feasible,
(g facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states,
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other
states concerned with the same child, and
(0 to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this section
i 980

73-45c 2. Definitions.
As used in this act
(I) 'Contestant* mears a person, including a
parent who claims a ngnt to custodv or visitation rights with resoet-t to a child,
< 2) 'Custodv determination * means a court decision and court orders and instructions providing for the custodv of a child, including visitation
ngnt3, it does not include a decision relating to
child support or any other monetary obligation of
any person,
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings
m which a custody determination is one of several issues, 3uch as an action for dissolution of
mamage, or legal separation, and includes child
neglect and dependency proceedings,
(4) "Decree * or 'custody decree' means a custody determination contained in a judicial decree
or order made in a custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a modification decree,
(5) "Home state * means the state in which the
child immediately preceding the time involved
lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and m the case of a child less than 3ix months old
the state in which the child lived from birth with
any of the persons mentioned Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are
counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(6) "Initial decree * means the first custody decree concerning a particular child,
(7) 'Modification decree * means a custody decree which modifies or replaces a prior decree,
whether made by the court which rendered the
prior decree or by another court,
(8) "Physical custody' means actual possession
and control of a child,
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person,
other than a parent, who has physical custody of
a child and who has either been awarded custody
by the court or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "State' means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia
1980

78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state.
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a
child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are met
(a) This state d) is the home state of the child
at the time of commencement of the proceeding,
or (n) had been the child's home state within six
months before commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from this state because of
his removal or retention by a person claiming his
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this
state,
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (l)
the child and his parents or the child and at
least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and (n) there is available in
this state substantial evidence concerning the
child s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships,
(c) The child is physically present in this state
and d) the child has been abandoned or (n) it is
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7S«45c-!}. Information as to custody of child and
litigation concerning required in
pleadings — Verification — Continuing duty to inform court.
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first
pleading or ih an affidavit attached to that pleading
shall give information under oath as to the child'3
present address, the places where the child has lived
within the iak five years, and the names and present
addresses of the persons with whom the child has
lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavit
every party phall further declare under oath as to
each of the following whether
(a) he has participated, as a party, witness, or
in any other capacity, in any other litigation concerning ihe custody of the same child in. this or
any othe^r state;
(b) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending in a court of
this or a^y other state; and
(c) he jknows of any person not a party to the
proceedings who has physical custody of the child
or claims to have custody or visitation rights
with respect to the child.
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is
in the affirmative the declarant shall give additional
information linder oath as required by the court. The
court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and as to other
matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the
disposition of the case.
(3) Each party h a s a continuing duty to inform the
court of any custody proceeding concerning t h e child
in this or an I other state of which h e obtained information during this proceeding.
1980
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^ . - r riuuc: of petitioner as basis for
* ** -.n4 jurisdiction — Nonce to an1
v - jurisdiction —• Ordering peti:o appear in other court or to
\ child — Awarding costs.
(Dlfthep* • .-r for an initial decree has wrongIIv taken tne :n..d from another state or has enn similar reprehensible conduct the court may
n exercise jurisdiction for purposes of adjudif :his is just and proper under the

i2^ Unless required in the interest of the child, the
-"-* « - " noc exercise its jurisdiction to modify a
ee of another state if the petitioner, with•>*" *'""* person entitled to custody has imchild from the physical custody
;
A custody or has improperly
i visit or other temporary
"istody. If the petitioner
* a custody decree of
notner state .e ^<~ —
Ane to exercise its
irisdiction if this is just and proper under the cir
umstances.
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdicion upon petition for an initial custody decree pursunt to Subsection (1), the court shall notify the parent
r other appropriate person and the prosecuting atorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other
tate. If a request to that effect is received from the
ither state, the court shall order the petitioner to
ippear with the child in a custody proceeding instiuted in the other state in accordance with Section
r
8-45c-2Q. If no such request is made within a reasonle time after such notification, the court, may enterin,, a petition to determine custody by the petitioner
it has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-2...
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction
modify the custody decree of another state pursuit to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section
i-4oc-14, the court shall notify the person who has
gal custody under the decree of the other state and
e prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdic)n in the other state and may order the petitioner to
turn the child to the person who has legal custody.
it appears that the order will be ineffective and the
gal custodian is ready to receive the child within a
triod of a few days, the court may place the child in
foster care home for such period, pending return of
le child to the legal custodian. At the same time, the
iurt shall advise the petitioner that any petition for
.odification of custody must be directed to the approbate court of the other state which has continuing
irisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines
irisdiction. to a court in a state which has jurisdicon pursuant to Section 73-45c-3.
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petion under this section may charge the petitioner
itk necessary travel and other expenses, including
ttor riey's fees and the cost of returning the child to
neither state.
i960

78- 45c 14, Modification of foreign decree —
Prerequisites — Factors considered.
(1) If a court of another state has made a custod)
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that
the court which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and
(b) the {court of this state has jurisdiction.
(2) If la court of this state is authorized under Subsection (1) and Section 78-45c-8 to modify a custody
decree of another s t a t e it shall give due consideration
to the transcript of the record and other documents of
all previous proceedings submitted to it in accordance
with Section 78-45c-22.
1980
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ne-essarv m an ^mer-ency to protect -.he cmld
because r.e has been suojected to or threatened
wi:a mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or deoendent; or
id* »u It aDpears that no other state would
have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantial! v in accordance with Paragraphs 'a;, (b), or
<c;. or another state has declined to exercise junsdiction on the ground that thi* state is the more
approDnate forum to determine the custody of
the child, and <ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Exceot under Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Subsection (1), phvsical presence in this state of the child, or
of the child and one of the contestants, isnot alone
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state
to make a child custody determination.
(3) Phvsical oresence of the child, while desirable,
is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his
1980
custody.
_
78-4oc-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction not exercised — Inquiry to
other state — Information exchange —
Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding.
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child
was pending in a court of another state exercising
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act,
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the
other 3tate because this state is a more appropriate
forum or for other reasons.
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and
other information supplied by the parties under Section 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody registry established under Section 78-45c-16 concerning
the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child
in other 3tates. If the court has reason to believe that
proceedings may be pending in another state it 3hail
direct an inquiry to the 3tate court administrator or
other appropriate official of the other state.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the
proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody
of the child was pending in another state before the
court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue
may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and
that information be exchanged in accordance with
Sections 73-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of
this 3tate has made a custody decree before being
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court of
the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding
was commenced in another state afler it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to
the end that the issues may be litigated in the more
appropriate forum.
1980
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73-45c-7.

Declining jurisdiction on rinding of inconvenient forum — Factors in determination — Communication with other
court — Awarding costs.
( D A court which has jurisdiction under this act to
make an initial or modification decree may decline to
exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to
make a custody determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is
a more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made
upon the court'3 own motion or upon motion of a
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative
of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum,
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this
purpose it may take into account the following fac, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was the
child'3 home state;
(b) if another state has a closer connection
with the child and his family or with the child
and one or more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily
available in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum
which is no less appropriate: and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of
this state would contravene any of the purposes
stated in Section 78-45c-l.
Before determining whether to decline or retain
diction the court may communicate with a court
mother state and exchange information pertinent
e assumption of jurisdiction by either court with
w to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised
«/ the more appropriate court and that a forum will
be available to the parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient
forum and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or
it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named 3tate or upon any other conditions which
may be just and proper, including the condition that a
moving party stipulate his consent and submission to
the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(6) The court may decline to exercise it3 jurisdiction under this act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding
while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other
proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an
inappropriate forum it may require the party who
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the
costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is
to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to
the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under
this section the court shall inform the court found to
be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state
is not certainly known, shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate
official for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication received from another
state informing this state of a finding of inconvenient
forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of
the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction
the court of this state shall inform the original court
of this fact.
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